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Abstract
Voting by mail has been gaining traction
for decades in the United States and has
emerged as the preferred voting method
during the COVID-19 pandemic [6, 54].
In this paper, we examine the security
of electronic systems used in the process
of voting by mail, including online voter
registration and online ballot tracking
systems. The goals of these systems, to
facilitate voter registration and increase
public confidence in elections, are laud-
able. They indisputably provide a crit-
ical public good. It is for these reasons
that understanding the security and pri-
vacy posture of the mail-in voting pro-
cess is paramount.
We find that online voter registration
systems in some states have vulnerabil-
ities that allow adversaries to alter or
effectively prevent a voter’s registration.
We additionally find that ballot tracking
systems raise serious privacy questions
surrounding ease of access to voter data.
While the vulnerabilities discussed here
are unlikely to enable an adversary to
modify votes, several could have the ef-
fect of disenfranchising voters and re-
ducing voter confidence in U.S. elections
infrastructure, thereby undermining the
very purpose of these systems.
1 Introduction
In an era where COVID-19 has necessi-
tated social distancing and an elimina-
tion of large gatherings, the logistics of
political elections in the United States
are a natural cause for concern. On
the one hand, it is important that our
democratic processes proceed as normal
and elections continue to take place; on
the other, in-person voting at central-
ized locations poses a potential health
threat to citizens and threatens to sup-
press voter turnout.
This leaves two possibilities for remote
voting: Internet voting or voting by
mail. Voting over the Internet has re-
peatedly been shown to be dangerously
insecure by security researchers, leav-
ing large-scale mail-based voting as the
only viable remote option [26, 28]. Vot-
ing by mail allows citizens to exercise
their right to vote from the safety of
quarantine. There are currently five
states—Colorado, Oregon, Washington,
Hawaii, and Utah—that conduct elec-
tions almost entirely by mail, and an
additional six provide a permanent mail
ballot option [11]. While only a hand-
ful of states currently vote primarily by
mail, U.S. Senators Amy Klobuchar and
Ron Wyden introduced a bill in March
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2020 that would “guarantee every voter
a secure mail-in paper ballot” [15, 11].
To reassure voters that their mailed bal-
lot is on its way or that their returned
ballot was counted, states that make
heavy use of voting by mail have widely
adopted online ballot tracking systems
[11]. These systems generally allow a
voter to track the status and location of
his or her ballot at any point and receive
notifications by email or SMS.
The novelty of these tracking systems is
such that none of them have yet been
publicly evaluated from a technical per-
spective. In this paper, we hope to
bridge this gap and provide an evalua-
tion useful for private citizens concerned
about their privacy as well as for elec-
tion administrators interested in ensur-
ing the integrity of their elections. The
ongoing pandemic serves as a reminder
that the security of remote systems that
support the voting process, such as on-
line voter registration systems and bal-
lot tracking systems, is equally as im-
portant as the security of in-person vote-
casting systems.
1.1 Existing Ballot Tracking Sys-
tems
While only five states conduct elections
entirely by mail, all states allow absen-
tee balloting pending an acceptable ex-
cuse, and so ballot tracking systems are
used across several states and counties.
There are three ballot tracking systems
currently in common use: Ballot Scout,
BallotTRACE, and BallotTrax. By our
count, around 15 states have counties
that use at least one of these three track-
ing websites.
Two of these three systems, Ballot-
TRACE and BallotTrax, were originally
developed in Colorado’s Denver County,
which has been the vanguard of voting
by mail. Each of these systems use the
USPS’ Intelligent Mail barcodes (IMb)
to track a ballot from when it is mailed
from a centralized election facility to
when the completed ballot is received
by local voting officials. The services
and tracking capabilities offered by all
three systems are effectively the same.
As an example, the web interface of Bal-
lotTRACE is shown in Figure 1.
Ballot Scout Ballot Scout is a web
application developed by Democracy
Works, a nonpartisan, non-profit organi-
zation that provides tools for voters and
support to election officials [52].
BallotTRACE BallotTRACE is a web
application developed by the Denver
Elections Division in 2009 in partnership
with a local software company, i3logix
[8]. It was the first of the three systems.
BallotTrax BallotTrax is available as
a web application and as an iOS mo-
bile application. It is a spin-off of Bal-
lotTRACE, marketed more widely by
i3logix. It is run as a for-profit service
[46].
2 Online Voter Registra-
tion
2.1 Current State of OVR
A voter must first submit a voter reg-
istration form in all states but North
Dakota in order to mail in a ballot.
This is traditionally done in person or
by mail, but starting with Arizona in
2004, voter registration has increasingly
moved online. As of February 3, 2020,
39 states and the District of Columbia
allow online voter registration (OVR) in
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Figure 1: BallotTRACE’s voter lookup search form.
some form. Cost savings associated with
OVR are often cited by election officials
as a significant reason for the shift, but
other perks include task automation and
greater convenience for voters [43, 48].
Verifying identities with personally iden-
tifying information (PII) over the in-
ternet and protecting this information,
however, requires some careful consider-
ation.
In many aspects, OVR mirrors mail-in
registration. Voters enter their name,
date of birth, and some PII that only
the voter is presumed to know. It is
most common for states to require only a
driver’s license/permit or state ID num-
ber for this PII [42]. This would be
problematic when an individual’s name
and date of birth are used to gener-
ate these numbers, as is the case in 11
states (which have had their generation
methodologies published by researcher
Alan De Smet) [35]. Maryland is one
such state, but allows voters to regis-
ter using only this ID number—the last
four digits of a voter’s Social Security
number (SSN) are only required if they
do not have a state ID [9]. This clearly
presents a potential avenue for voter im-
personation.
Many states require additional PII to
make their systems more secure. This
usually means requiring a voter’s SSN or
its last four digits, but some states opt
for an audit code or ID issuance date in-
stead. Unfortunately, none of this PII is
entirely secure.
2.2 Security Concerns
Sweeney et al. evaluated how voter iden-
tity theft done with OVR. They found
that much of the data required for ma-
licious registration is publicly available
or can be obtained via data brokers and
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the dark web. The paper claims 1%
of nationwide registrations could be tar-
geted with data costing only $10,081
to $24,926 in total, depending on the
source [40]. Disenfranchising 1% of vot-
ers could feasibly affect the outcome of
national elections if targeted correctly.
The authors acknowledge that the se-
curity risks with online registration are
not particularly new, but that the digi-
tal process makes it easier to carry out
such attacks on a larger scale. In or-
der to prevent large-scale identity theft
attacks through automation, the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL) recommends using CAPTCHA
on registration websites [21].
CAPTCHA provides some defense
against automated registration, but
the Harvard researchers point out
that this defense is being weakened
by the advancement of machine vision
algorithms. Programs developed by
Google, academic researchers, and
other companies can bypass a variety
of CAPTCHAs and re-CAPTCHAs
with 90+% accuracy, making them a
“nominal deterrent” [40].
It would appear, then, that securing
voter registration requires more than se-
curing just registration forms and web-
sites. This is highlighted by a reported
incident during the 2016 presidential
primary election in Riverside County,
California. District Attorney Michael
Hestrin ordered an investigation when
20 formal complaints were received on
election day, with voters claiming that
they were turned away from the polls
due to changes in their party registra-
tion that they had not made. The in-
vestigation found that registrations were
altered through California’s registration
website, but no IP addresses were col-
lected and no audits, if any were per-
formed, revealed suspicious activity [40,
29].
2.3 Security Recommendations
Audits should be routinely performed on
voter registration records in order to de-
tect an unusual volume of activity, as the
NCSL recommends [21]. We also rec-
ommend recording IP addresses that are
used when making registration changes
so investigations can make headway if
they are necessary. Providing confir-
mation of registration changes by any
available means of contact could also
alert voters to suspicious activity. For
instance, election security researcher J.
Alex Halderman recommends sending a
notice to a voter’s old and new addresses
when address changes are made online
[39].
When transferring data through online
registration forms, sensitive PII should
be end-to-end encrypted to minimize
the risk of adversaries capturing this
data and using it to modify registra-
tions. The National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) has spec-
ified best security practices when han-
dling election materials, including reg-
istration data. NIST recommends that
states use TLS 1.0 or above to encrypt
transmitted registration data [37]. We
would update this recommendation to
suggest using TLS 1.2 or above, given
that most browser support for 1.0 and
1.1 will be dropped soon due to security
vulnerabilities in each.
2.4 OVR Encryption Evaluation
We used an online server testing tool
provided by Qualys, Inc. to evaluate the
encryption protocol security of the OVR
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websites provided by each state and the
District of Columbia [20]. With the ex-
ception of Alaska’s website, each website
received a “B” rating or higher from the
tool. Alaska’s website received an “F”
for its vulnerability to “zombie POO-
DLE” attacks that allow some plaintext
reading and encrypted block reorganiza-
tion [10].
Two states’ websites—Florida’s and
Pennsylvania’s—demonstrate a vulner-
ability in their use of Diffie-Hellman
key exchange that allows a man-in-the-
middle attack known as “Logjam”. This
Logjam attack allows an adversary to
read and modify data passed over the
connection [2].
Five states’ websites—Iowa’s, Ken-
tucky’s, Nebraska’s, New York’s, and
Pennsylvania’s—don’t use forward se-
crecy. Without forward secrecy, an ad-
versary who discovers a server’s private
key can use it to decrypt any and all past
messages sent over the channel [19].
Unfortunately, 14 websites support TLS
1.0 and 20 support TLS 1.1. One
website—West Virginia’s—also provides
undesirable support for SSL 3. The
good news is that all websites support
TLS 1.2, and 10 even provide support
for TLS 1.3.
3 USPS Services
The United States Postal Service
(USPS) is the infrastructural backbone
that provides chain of custody service
for ballots and related election mail. It
has two main services utilizing the In-
telligent Mail barcode (IMb): Informed
Delivery (ID) and Informed Visibility -
Mail Tracking & Reporting (IV-MTR).
Informed Delivery is the older and orig-
inal initiative by the Postal Service
to improve transportation transparency,
while Informed Visibility is a service and
corresponding API provided to business
owners. Both attempt to provide end-
to-end tracking, with a few differences
in implementation.
Should Informed Delivery be compro-
mised, its utility in performing wholesale
fraud is at best, negligible. We primar-
ily assess ID and IV-MTR as a model
to inform us on the availability and ac-
cessibility of ballot-tracking services, as
well as its accuracy and confidentiality
measures. Security weaknesses in IV-
MTR pose a slightly larger threat, but
do not point to dire security dilemmas
in using vote-by-mail. As imperative as
the USPS is to scaling up vote-by-mail,
we feel it worthy to discuss past security
oversights in these systems and what has
been addressed since [11]. Security con-
cerns regarding the Intelligent Mail bar-
code will be discussed in §4.2, Barcode
Security; this section will focus on the
ID and IV-MTR services explicitly pro-
vided by USPS.
3.1 Informed Delivery
Informed Delivery was originally piloted
in 2014 for a few select zip codes, and
as of 2017 provides customers in most
major zip codes with the ability to de-
termine where their mail is in shipment.
Information provided through Informed
Delivery includes location information
based on scans of the parcels barcode at
each transfer point, and a grayscale im-
age of the front of the parcel. The need
to scan each individual parcel results in
poor real-time performance, with users
of Informed Delivery noting that the de-
livery estimates are often not reliable,
or mail updates coming in much later
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than expected. Performance optimiza-
tions were made to address these issues,
making Informed Visibility a more per-
formant “real-time tracker by not re-
quiring finer-granularity barcode track-
ing. The official site for accessing In-
formed Visibility states it “leverages in-
telligence to create logical and assumed
handling events to provide expanded vis-
ibility, or makes reasonable assumptions
regarding a parcels location based on the
movements of its expected carrier, with
any additional confirmation provided by
scanning the parcel itself [31, 33].
Prior to early 2019, USPS Informed De-
livery did not rigorously authenticate
identity before allowing users to access
the tracking service. Account creation
used a knowledge-based authentication
(KBA) scheme, using approximately 4
multiple-guess questions using informa-
tion from credit-bureaus. This secu-
rity scheme was woefully lacking and
led to a prolific string of stalking, credit
card fraud, and identity theft cases in
2017-2018 [16]. USPS hesitated to im-
plement proposed security schemes, in-
cluding utilizing its own postage service
to mitigate the widespread attacks for
nearly two years [17]. USPS strongly
urged users proactively make accounts
with strong passwords to counter the
fraudsters, and closing fraudulent ac-
counts required users to send sensitive
security question information to cus-
tomer support through email [16].
As of early 2019, we find that much of
the earlier concerns have largely been
addressed after several iterative failures
in addressing the weak security. Ac-
cessing Informed Delivery no longer re-
lies solely on KBA; services associated
with Informed Delivery are now decou-
pled from general account privileges and
require an extra one-time two-factor au-
thentication to access them. Per the
January 2020 USPS Informed Delivery
sign-up guide, Informed Delivery is not
available for businesses, while personal
use requires a valid address or P.O. box
in an eligible location [32]. Eligible lo-
cations allow three possible avenues for
registering for Informed Delivery.
Two of the avenues are given online,
with the third in fine print. Upon at-
tempting to view tracking information,
a user is prompted with the two main
signup options after account creation: a
one-time code sent to phone via SMS or
to request for a code to be mailed to the
registered address. The more convenient
method utilizes mobile account infor-
mation from carriers including AT&T,
T-Mobile, Verizon, U.S. Cellular, and
other branded wireless operators within
the United States. USPS account profile
information must match with regards to
address, name, and number as informa-
tion provided by the carrier before a
one-time passcode is sent [25]. For this
modality of verification, an attack would
require the account password, as well
as a phone number associated with the
correct address. There are no limits or
checks placed on changing Account Pro-
file information after logging in, but a
temporary lockout is placed on attempt-
ing to verify by phone after 3 changes
in a day. Should an account be veri-
fied, upon changing, prior verification is
nullified and re-authentication must be
done.
From testing with a toy account, in-
formation is simply checked against the
service/billing name and address associ-
ated with the phone number for authen-
tication. A motivated attacker could
likely change their address through their
service provider as we did using a volun-
teer’s Google Fi account to switch ad-
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dresses and sign up for one of our par-
ent’s residences. A screenshot from the
email associated with this toy account
of a recent Informed Delivery email is
shown below in igure 1]. The grayscale
image has been partially censored to
hide sensitive information for the pur-
poses of this report and is unaltered in
the email. The email service is an opt-
out feature of Informed Delivery.
The second option presented is to re-
quest for an invitation code to be sent to
the specified address by mail. For those
unable to do either, USPS also states
in fine print that they can authorize ac-
counts by walk-in at participating loca-
tions with proper identification.
To briefly cover accessibility with ID,
apartment addresses within eligible zip
codes are frequently ineligible for In-
formed Delivery sign-up. The third au-
thentication option, of allowing users
to authenticate their identities at select
postal service locations is likely not vi-
able for certain zip codes, and are en-
tirely unavailable at the time of this
writing. Vote-by-mail access has been a
concern for populations without a per-
manent address or P.O. box. Voter
registration and access to tracking or
registration services that require per-
manent addresses or a particular lo-
cality have seen poor registration and
disproportionately poorer turnout rates
among minority populations [45]. North
Dakota, a prominent and controversial
example of voting inaccessibility, agreed
to a court-order to ease registration re-
strictions on the basis of address after
nearly four years of litigation and only a
week prior to the writing of this section
[24].
3.2 Informed Visibility
Whereas security issues generally stem
from user authentication for Informed
Delivery, Informed Visibility-Mail
Tracking & Reportings security con-
cerns stem from its API. Ballot tracking
applications we examined do not explic-
itly state whether they use IV-MTRs
API to inform their mail-status updates
and announcements, so we will hit main
points of concern with IV-MTR.
IV-MTR returns multiple file formats,
from PKG to JSON, containing parcel
location information. Although we were
unable to access the current API doc-
umentation, an older copy of the API
[30] and a partially retracted 2018 se-
curity audit on IV-MTR implies numer-
ous security and encryption weaknesses,
system misconfigurations on each of the
13 IV-servers, among other concerns [12,
30]. Later the same year, news stories
reported that the API accepted wild-
card search parameters for nearly ev-
ery method and did not authenticate a
queries viewing permissions before re-
turning relevant data [18].
Poignantly, a report querying “for read-
ers who volunteered to help with this
research” was able to gain access to
“multiple accounts when those users had
more than one user signed up at the
same physical address” [18]. The secu-
rity audit only occurred a few weeks be-
fore the news break, and the allowance
of unverified wildcard search queries is a
non-trivial oversight. Assuming security
vulnerabilities have been patched, the
information a ballot tracing app has ac-
cess to through these APIs is not clear;
whether the app stores non-election re-
lated parcel information is also of con-
cern.
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Figure 2: Email received from using one member’s phone to sign-up at another member’s
address. Grayscale images of mail and incoming parcel bundles are shown. Sensitive information
redacted.
A scan of the 2019 copy of the IV-
MTR documentation published after
the security patch shows that although
connection is still only secured with
TLS 1.0, the authentication protocol
now requests user information in search
queries, and an authentication token
time-out after 15 minutes. [31].
4 Ballot Tracking Systems
4.1 Tracking System Authentica-
tion
All three major ballot tracking
systems—Ballot Scout, BallotTRACE,
and BallotTrax—have online web ap-
plications that allow a voter to view
their ballot tracking status [51, 4, 3].
These lookup systems authenticate
users using only voter record data that
is publicly available in many states,
however, enabling users other than the
voter in question to view the voters
ballot status and, perhaps of greater
concern, voting history.
States that make voter files public have
historically done so to allow public
scrutiny to prevent voter fraud, but
political campaigns have also benefited
greatly from the availability of voter
databases [34, 27]. Others have quickly
capitalized on this data. In 2018, two
mobile applications, VoteWithMe and
OutVote, were released. These ser-
vices used information from government
records to allow consumers to see whom
of their friends and family voted in re-
cent elections by matching the smart-
phone’s contacts to voter files [34], with
the effective end goal of using social
pressure to get people to vote. While
these apps have lost popularity since the
November 2018 election, ballot tracking
websites provide very similar informa-
tion and have renewed this conversation.
For example, Californias version of Bal-
lotTrax advertises on its homepage that,
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Figure 3: BallotTRACE’s lookup page for the mayor of Denver, CO, that displays partial
voting history indicating that the mayor cast a ballot in the 2020 primary elections, accessed
using public voter records. Sensitive information is redacted.
when using its system, “tracking your
ballot...has never been easier” [51]. Un-
fortunately, this ease comes with a secu-
rity tradeoff. BallotTrax asks voters for
their first name, last name, date of birth,
and ZIP code in order to view tracking
information, all data contained in Cal-
ifornias voter database which has been
made publicly available under freedom
of information requests [51].
Sites such as VoterRecords.com have
taken voter databases from several
states and collected the information un-
der one centralized website, allowing any
user to search for a voters record using
only their name, to view all voters regis-
tered in a particular district, and various
other combinations. According to its
website, VoterRecords.com is “sourced
from official government public records
that were released under FOIA and pub-
lic record laws” [49].
Although this site has collected the
records of just 16 out of 50 states, nu-
merous other states have their voter
databases separately available online.
New York, for example, is not included
in VoterRecords.com, but in 2019 the
New York City Board of Elections up-
loaded voter enrollment data for 4.6 mil-
lion voters to its website [50]. While
it appears that this particular database
has since been removed, the state allows
anyone to request the full voter list, and
private citizens have made a handful of
New York voter lookup tools available
online [23].
BallotTRACE, developed by i3logix in
Denver, Colorado, operates similarly
to BallotTrax. Figure 1 displays the
lookup form used by BallotTRACE and
shows that the system allows voter
lookup based only on first name, last
name, ZIP code, and birth year [4]. To
demonstrate the feasibility of arbitrary
voter lookup, we chose to look up the
voter information of the Mayor of Den-
ver, Michael Hancock, as an example.
Using voter record data from Voter-
Records.com, we were able to access the
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Figure 4: BallotTRACE’s notifications page for the mayor of Denver, CO. The system appears
to allow any user who accesses a voter information page to update voter notifications. Again,
sensitive information is redacted.
mayor’s ballot tracking status account
page, and further view the voting his-
tory for the 2020 primary, as shown in
Figure 3 [4]. We were further able to ac-
cess the Notification Preferences page,
as shown in Figure 4, and seemingly
could have modified or unsubscribed
from notification updates. Even with-
out making any modifications to contact
information, an adversary could view a
voter’s email address or partial phone
number, as demonstrated.
The problem is fundamentally one of in-
sufficient authentication. The system
cannot guarantee with any measure of
confidence that the user looking up a
particular voters information is truly the
voter if the only information required to
look up a voter is publicly available.
Our proposed solution is to recommend
the use of a 12-digit unique, random-
ized ID that is assigned to a particu-
lar ballot envelope. The concept is sim-
ilar to the United States 2020 Census
use of 12-digit Census IDs, which are
included in the materials mailed to res-
idents [1]. A state or county can pro-
vide a voter with this unique ID as part
of their paper-based or online absentee
ballot request. For states such as Cal-
ifornia that are planning on automati-
cally sending all voters mail-in ballots,
this ID could be included with the bal-
lot to enable voters to track its return
to their local election facility [7]. Vot-
ers could use this randomly assigned ID
along with typical identifying informa-
tion, such as first name and last name,
to authenticate themselves to the ballot
tracking system.
4.2 Web Lookup Form Security
Like online voter registration systems,
the various ballot tracking web applica-
tions all necessarily contain HTML or
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AngularJS forms in which voters can
enter their information. This input is
then used as the basis for subsequent
SQL queries to the election facilitys bal-
lot tracking database [51, 4, 3]. Given
this proximity to an important elections
database, properly securing these forms
is critical.
For a broad overview of the configura-
tion of each platforms TLS/SSL web
server, we used Qualys public SSL
Server Test scanning tool, which eval-
uates a website on the basis of its cer-
tificate, protocol support, key exchange,
and cipher strength [20].
BallotTRACE BallotTRACEs certifi-
cate signature algorithm uses SHA256
with RSA-4096. It only supports TLS
1.2 and above and is therefore secure
against attacks affecting older versions
of SSL/TLS like DROWN or POODLE
[20].
BallotTrax Californias BallotTrax sys-
tem uses a signature algorithm with
SHA256 and RSA with a 2048-bit key.
However, the server supports TLS 1.1, a
legacy version of TLS which has been
shown to be insecure [20]. Chrome
is planning on deprecating support for
TLS 1.0 and 1.1 in 2020, citing flaws
in MD5 and SHA-1, both used by these
older versions of TLS. Apple, Microsoft,
and Mozilla announced similar plans [5].
Ballot Scout Ballot Scouts signature
algorithm also uses SHA256 and RSA
with a 2048-bit key. Ballot Scout sup-
ports protocols TLS 1.2 and 1.3 and pre-
vents downgrade and other common at-
tacks [20].
Overall, BallotTRACE and Ballot
Scout’s server configurations provide
basic levels of security, although Bal-
lotTraxs configuration is flawed due to
its support of a legacy version of TLS.
Scanning all three sites for SQL injec-
tion vulnerabilities using Pentest-Tools
SQL Injection Scanner in addition
to manual input testing revealed no
SQL injection vulnerabilities [36].
While there are no automated scanners
capable of detecting all possible vulner-
abilities, these results are a promising
indicator of solid security practices.
4.3 Barcode Security
As previously mentioned when dis-
cussing USPS services, mail-in ballot
tracking is enabled through the use of
Intelligent Mail barcodes (IMBs), devel-
oped by the United States Postal Ser-
vice. Mailed ballots are contained in
an outer envelope with a 65-bar Intel-
ligent Mail barcode, the technical speci-
fications of which are publicly available
[13]. When a completed ballot is mailed
back, a machine at a central elections fa-
cility scans the barcode and updates the
ballot tracking information accordingly.
A barcode is fundamentally an input to
a system. As such, barcodes represent a
potential vulnerability. While an effec-
tive security policy naturally distrusts
system inputs and assumes the possi-
bility of a malicious adversary, barcode
scanners have not historically adopted
this attitude of distrust. A 2008 talk at
DEFCON demonstrated the feasibility
of multiple barcode-driven attacks, in-
cluding barcode-driven buffer overflow,
SQL injection, and cross-site scripting
attacks, and specifically mentioned In-
telligent Mail barcodes as an example
[41]. QR codes were also shown in 2012
to be capable of exploiting vulnerabil-
ities in the reader software or operat-
ing system, such as SQL injections [14].
Since then, the capabilities and motiva-
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tions of malicious adversaries have only
increased, but there has been no evi-
dence that barcode security has seen a
commensurate increase in attention.
A barcode, then, is actually an attack
vector into a system. A maliciously
crafted barcode is capable of launching
common security attacks. In the ballot
tracking process, the concern is that an
adversary could create a malicious bar-
code and mail back an envelope with
this barcode instead of a genuine In-
telligent Mail barcode. This adversar-
ial barcode would then be scanned at
an elections facility, conceivably caus-
ing damage to election databases track-
ing which ballots have been returned—
and, far more consequentially, who has
already voted in the election. To mit-
igate potential consequences of a mali-
cious barcode, then, the application that
takes in scanner data should validate
and sanitize all inputs, whether in text
or barcode form.
5 Information Privacy
In order to properly deliver results of
ballot tracking to a voter, ballot track-
ing services often require the submission
of personal data. In order to deliver up-
dates on a voters ballot, Ballot Scout re-
quires the submission of a voters name,
address, year of birth, and email address
or phone number. Ballot Scout notes in
their privacy policy that they do not dis-
close any of your personal information
unless required by law[53].
While in many states voter information
is public, the amount of data varies be-
tween states and the means by which to
obtain the information are different as
well [38]. This is where a crucial dis-
tinction lies. It might be very possible to
obtain voter information in many states,
but there is often a process by which
one must request a list of voter informa-
tion. As a result, there is a paper trail
that could pin responsibility. While that
does not directly protect privacy in and
of itself, the fact that any malicious act
as a result of this information request
could be traced back to the requester
is thwarting. When methods are intro-
duced by which to obtain this informa-
tion in an anonymous way via hacking,
the privacy of the voting public is put at
greater risk.
The schema and means by which the in-
formation is stored is not publicly avail-
able, as these ballot tracking services are
powered by private corporations. Pre-
sumably this is to ensure the highest
level of security as to not expose any
vulnerabilities of the system. However,
this does pose the privacy concern of
aggregate voter statistics. As it would
be necessary to track ones ballot, the
ballot tracking services are made aware
of distinct voter actions. These actions
can be defined as but are not limited
to: whether or not the individual has
voted, at what time they voted, where
they chose to deposit their vote. While
the contents of the ballot might remain
secure, the behaviors of voters may not.
Similar to Ballot Scout, many tracking
services explicitly state that they will
not give away your personal informa-
tion. However, there are no such lines in
the privacy policies describing the usage
or sale of aggregate statistics obtained
by tracking the voter ballots [53].
This brings up the issue of differential
privacy: wherein, the aggregate statis-
tics must be able to describe patterns
of groups within the dataset while with-
holding personally identifiable informa-
tion, in this case the actions of the in-
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dividual. If the company were to sell
aggregate information that could isolate
individuals, it becomes much easier for
political entities to interfere with the
mail-in voting process. This becomes
vulnerable to an attack such as a Mem-
bership Attack in which the attacker can
determine whether or not a specific indi-
vidual falls within a subset of the data.
For example, an adversary would be able
to determine, via membership attack, a
set of individuals that do not vote by
mail. In a state where vote by mail is
the only option, contextual information
such as this example becomes very pow-
erful in determining the behavior of vot-
ers. Similarly, since party affiliation is
publicly known, with the voter actions
known of a subset of individuals, the
following scenario could occur: Time or
location data for mail-in ballots are re-
leased or sold to Party A. Party A, via
membership attack, isolates and learns
that Party B voters tend to deposit their
ballots at a certain time or location more
frequently. As a result, Party A tam-
pers with deposit boxes in that location
for only those specific times to achieve
a maximal impact result with minimal
effort.
The problem of privacy becomes com-
pounded when the security of said in-
formation is subjected to multiple weak
points. Ballot tracking services are not
powered entirely by the technology of
the given corporation. As a result they
are not solely responsible for all of the
potential security breaches. Trackers re-
quire the usage of third party tools in
order to deliver their end product. In
the case of Ballot Scout, to deliver its
tracking services it enlists the services
of the following services: Twilio, Ama-
zon SES, and SmartyStreets [53]. Each
of these distinct services gain access to
different pieces of a voters personal in-
formation. These services similarly rely
on other 3rd party services. As a re-
sult, a chain of dependencies is created
in which a voters personal data is ex-
posed at multiple different points.
Twilio, for example, had a breach in
2018 from one of its providers, Voxox,
that resulted in SMS message details be-
ing leaked [44]. Since Twilio is used to
power voter notifications, a hack on any
part of this pipeline could result in the
adversary being aware of where the bal-
lot is due to these notifications. The ad-
versary could similarly obtain authenti-
cation codes to register ballot tracking
properly. It seems imperative that there
must be accountability for the pipeline
of providers that have access to voters
personal information. Otherwise, the
public must be adequately educated on
the reach that their personal informa-
tion has when being provided to a ballot
tracking service such as Ballot Scout.
6 Conclusion
Vote-by-mail has received increased
scrutiny during the COVID-19 pan-
demic, with widespread implementation
seen as a necessity given social distanc-
ing restrictions. States that have imple-
mented no-excuse, state-wide vote-by-
mail have seen vast successes and with
higher voter turnout, highlighting its ef-
ficacy as an alternative to traditional on-
site ballot casting.
Security concerns and lack of trans-
parency with the chain of custody are
often cited as the primary reason for
sticking to traditional voting methods.
Voters want to ascertain their ballots
are actually counted or not stolen, and
for good reason as on-site voting ma-
13
chines already have numerous security
vulnerabilities [22]. Attempts to rec-
tify this have produced numerous web
and mobile applications, including Bal-
lot Scout, BallotTRACE, and Ballot-
Trax, that provide users with an inter-
face to view “end-to-end mail tracking
information” [33]. Unfortunately, any
technological augmentation to a paper-
based voting scheme is itself a potential
security vulnerability.
In performing security analyses on these
applications and other relevant sites, we
have reaffirmed that although there ex-
ist concerns–including the use of weak
user authentication and online voter reg-
istration site schemes–none present vul-
nerabilities that can be exploited on a
large scale to directly influence an elec-
tion. The example fraudulent account
we temporarily created for USPS, for in-
stance, requires an attacker to leave an
information trail with their respective
phone carrier, and is not scalable. Al-
though ballot tracking systems pose con-
cerning privacy questions, it would be
difficult for an adversary to use them to
perpetrate voter fraud on a large scale.
Our findings entirely support the no-
tion that vote-by-mail is an ideal scheme
for wide-spread implementation, despite
its flaws related to tracking. Vote-by-
mail offers a robust paper-trail and has
been shown to increase voter turnout
and engagement [47]. The electronic
systems supporting remote voter regis-
tration and voting, however, will need
significant security improvements before
we can truly trust them to uphold the
integrity of our democratic processes.
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